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Abstract—Cloud computing services are becoming more and 
more popular. However, the high concentration of data and 
services on the clouds make them attractive targets for various 
security attacks, including DoS, data theft, and privacy attacks. 
Additionally, cloud providers may fail to comply with service level 
agreement in terms of performance, availability, and security 
guarantees. Moreover, users may choose to utilize public cloud 
services from multiple vendors for various reasons including fault 
tolerance and availability. Therefore, it is of paramount importance 
to have secure and efficient mechanisms that enable users to 
transparently copy and move their data from one provider to 
another.  In this paper, we explore the state-of-the-art inter-cloud 
migration techniques and identify the potential security threats in 
the scope of Hadoop Distributed File System HDFS.  We propose 
an inter-cloud data migration mechanism that offers better security 
guarantees and faster response time for migrating large scale data 
files in cloud database management systems. The proposed 
approach enhances the data security processes used to achieve 
secure data migration between cloud nodes thus improves 
applications’ response time and throughput. The performance of 
the proposed approach is validated by measuring its impact on 
response time and throughput, and comparing the performance to 
that of other techniques in the literature. The results show that our 
approach significantly improves the performance of HDFS and 
outperforms its counterparts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Public cloud computing paradigm is continuously gaining 
momentum as a reliable and cost effective solution to public 
computing needs. It delivers computing resources over the 
Internet and stores users’ data on the cloud. Customers enjoy 
unlimited data storage and computation power as per pay 
bases while the underlying hardware/software resources are 
maintained and managed by the Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP). The cloud storage model can be classified into private 
and public clouds. Private clouds provide services and utilities 
to a small group of enterprises. The data and service 
management of the cloud is performed locally by the 
enterprise. In public clouds, organizations and individuals 
have cloud services from a third party who manages the cloud 
 [4]- [7]. Most of enterprises prefer to deploy their own private 
clouds for data storage driven by the privacy and security 
concerns  [30]. However, the world is producing very vast 
amount of data (big data) in every day routine. The traditional 
data processing and storage systems cannot handle the 
characteristics and the requirements of big data and no longer 
suitable to meet the new big data challenges  [16] [17]. 
Therefore, outsourcing data and computation to public clouds 
becomes a more practical solution. The Apache Hadoop  [9] is 
an open source cloud database solution developed to address 
the unique challenges of big data. Hadoop has its own file 
system called Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS). HDFS 
architecture was initially designed to store and process data 
assuming HDFS is operating in a secure world. However, 
HDFS architecture has very critical problems which lead to 
loss of sensitive information. A fix for HDFS has been 
proposed in  [2] to provide secure management of data in 
HDFS.  
As the demand for cloud services increases, the 
competition between cloud service providers also increases. 
For cloud clients to benefit from such competition, they 
should be able to freely and easily migrate their data from one 
cloud to another. This migration could be triggered, for 
example, by cost, performance, bandwidth, reliability, 
security, or legal issues. However, this migration may incur 
potential threats to the privacy of the clients and the security 
of their data  [32]. In this work, we propose a secure inter-
cloud data migration architecture that takes into consideration 
the efficiency of the migration process, the privacy of the 
clients, and the confidentiality of the data. Our proposed 
protocol provides secure and efficient inter-cloud data 
migration on Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) based 
clouds. The internal data security is ensured by the HDFS 
security layer  [2].  Our protocol requires that sensitive data are 
always stored in encrypted format with a key known only to 
the data owner. This requirement greatly enhances the data 
migration efficiency as the migration engine would not be 
responsible for encrypting and decrypting large chunks of data 
while being migrated  [20] [31]. More importantly, this helps to 
boost the security of the migrated data against both insiders 
and outsiders. Data owner encryption ensures data 
confidentiality while our data migration protocol ensures data 
integrity  [29]. Moreover, our protocol protects against attacks 
that try to utilize the migration process to cause data loss. The 
acknowledgment mechanism that we introduce ensures that 
data at the source is only removed after the destination 
successfully received it.  The security and performance 
evaluation of our protocol shows its superiority over the state-
of-the-art inter-cloud data migration protocol  [3].  
Inter-cloud data migration is a relatively new problem and 
its security guarantees has not received the due attention. The 
inter-cloud secure data migration has also been discussed in 
 [3]. However, the work in  [3] has some very serious security 
and performance issues that we will thoroughly discuss in 
Section II. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we go over the background material and the related work. In 
Section  III, we present our secure inter-cloud data migration 
protocol. In Section  IV, we present the experimental results. 
In Section V, we discuss the performance evaluation. Finally, 
in Section VI, we draw the conclusion and future work. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
The Apache Hadoop is proposed and implemented to deal 
with big data requirements. The Hadoop storage file system is 
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) which is distributed, 
scalable and portable file system. The majority of cloud service 
providers use HDFS for cloud storage to utilize the scalable 
and reliable distributed storage features of Hadoop  [9]. HDFS 
is comprised of Hadoop clusters. Each cluster contains one 
Name Node and multiple Data Nodes  [1]. The Name Node 
stores metadata related to files and directories such as size, 
permissions, type, modifications, etc. In addition, it stores 
information related to clients’ data on Data Nodes. The actual 
data is stored on Data Nodes. The client requests are processed 
using Map-Reduce parallel programming model  [11]. The 
client submits read or write requests to Map-Reduce node 
called Job Tracker.  The Job Tracker performs HDFS 
operations on client’s behalf. The Job Tracker divides client’s 
request into different tasks to release burden at Job Tracker. 
The Job Tracker launches tasks which run on nodes called 
Task Trackers. Each Task Tracker then communicates with 
HDFS Name Node and Data Nodes on behalf of the user 
 [2] [14]. Like other file systems, we can perform different I/O 
operations on HDFS for read, write and update. In order to 
read or write to HDFS, client first contacts the Name Node to 
get the block IDs for the Data Nodes and then submits his 
requested job to the Job Tracker along with the block IDs. The 
Job tracker launches one or more Task Trackers which perform 
the requested operations on data nodes and returns the results 
to the client. 
The original implementation of HDFS is not designed with 
security in mind and has many security issues, including: the 
lack of access control mechanisms, especially at the level of 
Name Node and Data Nodes and the lack of data 
confidentiality guarantees as data is stored in plain-text format. 
The authors in  [2] propose a Kerberos-based  [11] secure 
authentication model for HDFS. It allows only authorized users 
to access HDFS, a user can only access his own files, and a 
user can only modify his own Map-Reduce jobs. Kerberos is a 
trusted third-party protocol that is used to securely prove 
identity of nodes to each other over insecure networks. Further 
communications among the different modules of HDFS are 
totally based on delegation tokens generated by the Name 
Node after correctly authenticating the user using Kerberos. In 
 [19], the authors present a data encryption mechanism for data 
nodes. The proposed mechanism guards the encryption key 
from insiders by separating the public and private keys on the 
client and the data node. These mechanisms greatly enhance 
the intra-HDFS security; however, they do not address the 
inter-HDFS security concerns.  
The first attempt to address the inter–HDFS security 
concerns was by O’Malley et al.  [3]. The authors discuss the 
secure data migration between cloud storages that are based on 
Hadoop distributed file system.  The source cloud initiates the 
data migration based on users’ request to a target cloud.  The 
data migration process is triggered by the user through a 
request to the source cloud. The source cloud authenticates the 
user and validates his authorization for the requested data 
migration. After successful authorization of the user, the 
source cloud initiates a SSL connection with the target cloud, 
after which, the secure inter-cloud data migration starts. We 
perform thorough analysis of this protocol and found that it 
contains noticeable security concerns and performance issues.  
A recent related study  [18] also discusses the security of 
storage data migration between different clouds. Both  [3] and 
 [18] address propose secure migration mechanisms that depend 
on secure socket layer (SSL) connection between the name 
nodes of both source and target cloud systems. Target name 
node generates a temporary session key (T.Kdn), a random 
number (R.hash) and series of tickets encrypted by T.Kdst to 
communication with the source nodes, compute the double 
hash value and return the encrypted tickets to the source name 
node respectively. However, they didn’t specify how the user 
is authenticated at both source and destination clouds. The 
target cloud should verify whether the user has truly requested 
the source cloud to initiate data migration on his behalf rather 
than a malicious away to illegally exfiltrate data. Moreover, the 
acknowledgment model has not been correctly defined. This 
may present serious security issues. On one hand, if no 
acknowledgment is assumed after sending the data from the 
source to the target cloud, the source Data Node deletes the 
data after being transferred without any knowledge whether it 
has been correctly received. This enables a man-in-the-middle 
attacker to create considerable data lost. The attacker drops the 
packets, the source deletes them, and the receiver did not get 
any data. On the other hand, if the target acknowledges the 
successful reception of the packets, the administrator would be 
vulnerable to flood attacks over duplicate reception of packets 
carrying the same ticket. Finally, these mechanisms cause 
unnecessary network bandwidth and processing overhead due 
to the extra transmission of tickets and extra encryptions as we 
show in Section IV. For example, it is not clear why double 
hash is being used. 
In  [21], the authors propose a simple approach to encode 
and decode actual data during migration of large databases. 
However, synchronization has to be performed as multiple 
users can access the server simultaneously. In case of server 
failure, the receiver will not be able to communicate with the 
sender; a recovery mechanism is required instead. Authors of 
 [22] propose a privacy-preserving architecture for inter-Cloud 
data sharing. This architecture supports a proactive mechanism 
which relies on network services, like e-mail, to send 
asynchronous notification messages to all clients of the data 
share group, with the link to that information into the STaaS 
provider infrastructure. However, it is vulnerable to identity 
masquerading, through for example, compromise of the 
client’s email. Authors of  [23] propose an extension to the ISO 
27001:2005 standard and the evaluation of ISO 27001:2005 
completeness towards cloud security. They include a control 
objective for virtualization management, with two controls: 
virtualization and virtual machines control. They propose that 
the information involved in virtual machines is protected from 
internal and external threats, and secured in transit. However, 
neither the information nor management and controlled 
involved in virtual machines are well defined. The mechanism 
of securing inter-cloud data is not provided as well. 
In  [24], the authors propose an Inter-cloud Resource 
Integration System (Iris) using nested virtualization and 
OpenFlow technologies.  Iris dynamically configures and 
provides a virtual infrastructure over inter-cloud resources, on 
which an IaaS cloud can run. The inter-cloud federation system 
establishes secure isolation between HaaS and IaaS to avoid 
security incidents in a HaaS data center. HaaS system enables 
migrant VMs between data centers using the same IaaS API. 
However, during VM migration, the memory pages are copied 
over HaaS data centers which introduce heavy inter-cloud 
communication traffic after migration. Therefore, the migration 
time grows as the network latency increases. Moreover, Iris 
does not support migration of VMs with different security 
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levels over the hybrid clouds which allow for high risk attacks 
and large number of threats.  Authors of  [25] present a privacy-
aware VM migration framework, which causes minimal 
service level agreement (SLA) disruption. All the VMs are 
divided into two categories according to the data sensitivity: 
sensitive VMs and non-sensitive VMs. For consideration of 
data privacy, the sensitive VMs should run in private cloud. 
However, VM migration should only be allowed if both source 
and destination servers are trusted which is not the case 
between private cloud and public cloud. Moreover, threats can 
take place through migrating sensitive data from private cloud 
to public cloud as no authorized data migration mechanism is 
applied between source and destination clouds. The problem of 
secure data migration among clouds can be mapped and benefit 
from problems in other domains such as sensor network 
security  [33]- [43] and network coding  [44] [45]. 
 
III. SECURE INTER-CLOUD DATA MIGRATION 
We present here a complete inter-cloud secure data 
migration protocol that ensures the integrity and the 
confidentiality of user’s data while preserving user’s privacy. 
Our protocol builds on the intra-Hadoop security protocol  [2] 
and addresses all the security concerns of the current state-of-
the-art inter-cloud data migration protocol  [3]. Also, our 
protocol addresses the performance concerns of the current 
inter-cloud data migration protocol by reducing its networking 
and processing overhead. In the following, we present the 
assumptions, the initial setup and the detailed protocol steps.  
A. Assumption   
We assume that a user (U) who plans to move his data from a 
source cloud (SC) to a target cloud (TC) has already 
established user accounts with both the source cloud and the 
destination cloud. We assume that SC and TC are trusted by 
the user, but TC and SC may not trust each other.  
B. Initial setup 
The user initiates the data migration process by generating a 
symmetric key Kt. The user then uses his secure 
communication channels with both the source cloud and the 
target cloud (ID/Password pairs) to deliver the key to both the 
source cloud and the target cloud. This step ensures that no 
one but the legitimate owner of the data can initiate the 
migration. Figure 1 presents the user authentication steps at 
both source and target clouds which are described as follows: 
1. The user login to the source and the target clouds 
independently using his login credentials. 
2. The user generates a random key Kt 
3. The key Kt is encrypted by user’s account password at 
source and is sent to source.  
4. The key Kt is encrypted by user’s account password at 
target and is sent to the target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Fig. 1. User authentication at the source and the destination clouds 
The user then executes the following steps that are 
illustrated in figure 2 to finalize the data migration from the 
source to the target cloud:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Inter-Cloud data migration protocol 
1. The source cloud sends to the target cloud the necessary 
metadata of the user, such as data block IDs, Data Node 
addresses and any other related information that locates 
user’s data on the Data Nodes of the source cloud. This 
metadata is encrypted using Kt.  
2. The target generates block access tokens and encrypts 
them using Kt.  
3. The target shares these block access tokens with its data 
nodes.  
4. The target Data Node requests for reading data from the 
source Data Node and sends them the respective token. 
5. The source Data Node receives the request and decrypts 
the token to verify authenticity of the request.  
6. The source Data Node sends the data to the target Data 
Node and also sends the computed hash value of data 
encrypted by Kt. The source Data Node starts a timer and 
waits for acknowledgment. If acknowledgment is not 
received in time due to network problems or any other 
issues, the packet is retransmitted. The source Data Node 
keeps retransmitting until either a successful 
acknowledgment is received or a predefined maximum 
number of retransmissions (MaxRet) is reached. In the 
latter case, the administrator in the source is prompted.  
7. The target Data Node receives the data and verifies its 
hash value.  
8. If correctly verified, the target Data Node sends 
acknowledgment back to the source Data Node 
encrypted by Kt. If the acknowledgment is lost due to 
network problems or some other issue, the target Data 
Node may receive more than one copy of the same 
packet due to retransmissions. In this case all the 
duplicate copies are dropped. However, if the number of 
duplicate copies exceeds MaxRet, the administrator in 
the target is prompted.  
9. The source data node receives acknowledgement and 
deletes the successfully delivered data.   
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Considerable attentions have been made for securing inter-
cloud data migration to improve HDFS performance. In this 
context, several approaches make modifications in how data 
is encrypted, and transferred between source and target 
cloud nodes.
Indeed, most studies in the literature present extra security 
overhead  [2] [3] which influence the system performance 
especially when big data files are distributed over large 
number of cloud data nodes. 
The demand for efficient approach to such data migration 
security facilities has been addressed in our approach, 
concerning data security, privacy, and integrity within the 
framework. Accordingly, a secure big data migration system 
over heterogeneous inter-cloud environment has been 
developed. To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed 
system, extensive experiments are conducted to evaluate the 
performance of our approach for migrating big data files. The 
cloud system performance is tested on big data file sizes (100 
MB, 1GB, 2GB, 4GB, 8GB, and 16GB) and measure the 
migration time overhead.  
To setup the cloud system of such experiments, Apache 
Hadoop 2.6.0  [26] is installed on PowerEdge R720 servers 
that consists of 2 x (6 Core) Intel Xeon E5-2630 v2 @ 
2.60GHz, 64.0 GB RAM, runs Linux Ubuntu 10.04, java 
1.0.7- openjdk and connected with Gigabit Ethernet NICs.  
PuTTY 0.64  [27] is installed to configure the experiments 
and compare the performance of our protocol against the 
baseline Hadoop, the secure intra-cloud Hadoop  [2], and the 
secure intra-cloud Hadoop  [3]. User authentication in both 
source and target clouds are done using a private key through 
Putty SSH authentication system. To start data migration 
process, the user private key is integrated with a public key. 
After passing the authentication processes, the user is 
connected to the target cloud and startup the data migration 
process. Figure 4 depicts the time (sec.) required to migrate 
100MB data file by using HDFS baseline.  
Table I presents the data migration time (sec.) required to 
authenticate, extract and load 6 different big data file sizes 
using HDFS Baseline, secured intra, inter and proposed 
methods at migration rate of 64Mb/s. 
TABLE I.  DATA MIGRATION TIME (SEC.) 
FOR BASELINE AND SECURED HDFS METHODS 
Method 100MB 1GB 2GB 4GB 8GB 16GB 
Baseline 12.5 128.3 262.5 550.2 1156.1 2392.9 
Secured 
HDFS [2] 
14.1 170.4 381.9 814.8 1761.7 3709.6 
Secured 
HDFS [3] 13.9 161.8 348.4 741.9 1601.4 3363.1 
Proposed 
secured 
HDFS 
12.7 145.8 302.1 636.9 1356.7 2843.2 
 
This table shows that the data migration results in our method 
outperform other methods in comparison and much closer to 
the baseline case.  If we assume that the extract and load 
times are same in all methods, then the securing processes in 
our method consumes less time and hence improves the cloud 
system performance. 
The delay time caused by secured data migration processes is 
defined as the difference between the data migration time in 
secured HDFS (DMTS) and the data migration time in the 
HDFS baseline (DMTB). Equation 1 illustrates the calculated 
formula of the delay time. 
 
Delay Time = DMTS – DMTB          (1) 
 
Figure 5 shows the delay time (sec.) caused by secured HDFS 
methods. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Data migration delay time in secured HDFS 
 
Based on our data migration experiments, it can be inferred 
that the delay time caused by our approach is much less than 
other methods which leads to achieve high performance. 
However, applying the secured data migration processes will 
generally decrease HDFS performance as it cause delay time. 
 
The HDFS performance degradation is defined as the delay 
time caused by secured HDFS method divided by the data 
migration time in HDFS baseline.  
Table II shows the performance degradation caused by 
secured HDFS approaches. 
 
TABLE II.  PERFORMANCE DEGRADATION 
CAUSED BY SECURED HDFS METHODS 
Method 100MB 1GB 2GB 4GB 8GB 16GB 
Secured 
HDFS 
[2] 
12.8% 32.8% 45.5% 48.1% 52.4% 55.0% 
Secured 
HDFS 
[3] 
9.9% 26.1% 32.7% 34.8% 38.5% 40.5% 
Our 
secured 
HDFS 
1.4% 13.6% 15.1% 15.8% 17.4% 18.8% 
 
During inter-cloud data migration, the secured HDFS 
memory pages are copied over cloud data nodes.  Therefore, 
the secured data migration time increases as the network 
latency increases. Despite the fact that the secured HDFS 
methods are bit slower than general HDFS, the experiments 
results show that inter-cloud data migration time are nearly 
close regardless the file size. However, the results emphasize 
that our approach has marginally less overhead compared to 
other approaches  [2] [3]. 
 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
The migration process mainly consists of three 
communication phases:  
(i) The setup communication among the user, the source 
and the target clouds  
(ii) The communication for address sharing between the 
source and the target cloud 
(iii) The communication between the source data nodes and 
the target data nodes for actual data transfer.  
The communication between the user and the source/target 
cloud is protected by the shared credentials between the user 
and the source/target cloud. The communication between the 
source and the target name nodes for metadata sharing is 
protected by Kt. The attacker might capture the metadata 
transmitted from the source to the target, however, the 
contents cannot be read, which makes our solution secure 
from passive attackers. The encryption of the metadata also 
helps to guard against some active attackers. Attacker may 
present himself to the source as the target or vice versa, but 
he cannot encrypt/decrypt the necessary metadata and thus 
the attack fails. In the phase of communication between the 
source data node and the target data node, the target data node 
initially sends the encrypted block access tokens to the source 
data node where it can be captured by attackers but cannot be 
decrypted. The source data node decrypts the block access 
tokens and sends the user’s data along with hash value of the 
data concatenated with a random nonce to prevent replay 
attacks. The source only encrypts the hash value because 
user’s data is already stored in encrypted form. One possible 
attack here is to change the data packets during transmission 
or block them in the middle.  The integrity of the data is 
verified through the associated hash value and the successful 
reception of the data is verified by the returned 
acknowledgment. The integrity of the acknowledgment is 
also guaranteed.  
On the other hand, as we mentioned earlier, the inter-cloud 
data migration protocol presented in  [3] lacks proper 
authentication of the user with both the source and the target 
clouds. Also, the protocol wrongly assumes full trust between 
the source and the target clouds. The source and target may 
not fully trust each other. Also, a corrupted insider at the 
source may start migration of data without the user’s consent 
or request. The target cloud does not verify the proper 
initiation of the migration by the right user.  On the other 
hand, our proposed protocol ensures that the migration is only 
triggered by the user and provides both the target cloud and 
the source cloud the means to correctly verify the process.  
Next, we discuss the behavior of our protocol in the face of 
the man-in-the-middle attack. Assume that a man-in-the-
middle attacker controls the communication in step 4. Also 
assume that the goal of the attacker is to divert the data being 
migrated from the legitimate target to his own storage in a bid 
to steal the data. The attacker stops the message from the 
target data node and presents himself as the target data node. 
The source data node correctly verifies the token and sends 
the data along with the hash value back to attacker. This 
attack will fail because the hash value is encrypted by Kt 
which is only known to the legitimate target Data node. Also 
the data itself is encrypted by a key which is only known to 
the legitimate user. Therefore, even though the attacker may 
get the data he cannot benefit from it. If the goal of the 
attacker is to cause data loss by making the source to delete 
the data without being successfully received and stored in the 
target. As we mentioned earlier, the source cloud only deletes 
the data when it receives the acknowledgment from the 
related target data node. The acknowledgment message is 
computed using the hash value sent by the source and Kt. The 
attacker cannot forge a correct acknowledgment as he does 
not possess Kt and, therefore, would not be able to convince 
the source that the data has been successfully received unless 
it is truly received by the legitimate target Data node. Table 
III summarizes the security status of each step of our 
protocol. 
 
TABLE III. SECURITY STATUS IN OUR 
PROTOCOL STEPS 
Step Evaluation 
1 The communication is encrypted by Kt. 
3 The tokens are shared using internal security of 
HDFS  
4 The tokens are encrypted using Kt.  
6 Data is encrypted by a key which is only known 
to the user and integrity is guarded by a hash 
encrypted by Kt  
8 The acknowledgment is encrypted by Kt.  
 
Our protocol addresses all the security issues of  [3]. The 
migration process requires that the target cloud should know 
the necessary metadata at the source name node. Our protocol 
achieves this goal by using the common key Kt (established 
by the user between the source and the target clouds). 
Moreover, this key serves as an authentication to both the 
source and the target clouds that the migration has been 
triggered by the owner of the data. Finally, having this 
common key enables both the target and the source clouds to 
generate and verify the necessary tokens without having them 
to be unnecessarily transferred from one cloud to another. 
Our inter-cloud data migration does not only provide better 
security guarantees but also it slightly decreases the network 
and processing overhead compared to  [3]. Our protocol 
optimizes the communications and the encryption and 
decryption operations between the source and the target 
clouds. An important factor that we have introduced is that 
the data does not need to be encrypted or decrypted during the 
migration at the source and the target cloud. If the data is 
sensitive, then it would have been stored in encrypted format. 
Otherwise integrity check would be sufficient during the 
migration when we deal with public clouds. 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this work, we propose and evaluate a new inter-cloud secure 
data migration protocol. The protocol addresses the security 
concerns of the current state-of-the-art secure inter-cloud data 
migration protocols. The new protocol ensures data integrity 
and confidentiality during the migration process. The protocol 
uses secure mutual authentication between the source and the 
target clouds to countermeasures potential sabotage attacks that 
may use the migration process to destroy the data being 
migrated. The protocol also ensures that the migration process is 
initiated by the legitimate owner of the data and not by a 
malicious perpetrator trying to ex-filtrate the data. The 
contribution of our protocol lies in the extra security guarantees 
provided with even (marginal) less performance overhead 
compared the state-of-the-art inter-cloud data migration 
protocols.   
We perform both external and internal evaluation of our 
approach. In the internal evaluation, we measure the impact of 
using our technique on inter-cloud services performance like 
elapsed time caused by securing HDFS and throughput. In the 
external evaluation, we compare the performance of our 
approach to that of other techniques in the literature.  
 
The results show that our approach significantly improves 
services requirement satisfaction in cloud systems. This 
conclusion requires more investigation and experiments. 
Therefore, as future work we plan to investigate our approach 
on larger data files distributed over large number of cloud data 
nodes. In addition, we will consider applying search based 
technique to perform more intelligent data reallocation. Finally, 
we intend to filter the data into sensitive data where security 
concerns have high priority to be addressed and non-sensitive 
data where security concerns have less priority.   
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